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PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: I will now turn over the podium to
Judge Richard Goldstone, a former member of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa and a Global Professor of Law at New York University
Law School.
Judge Goldstone in addition to being the Chief Prosecutor in the
early days of the ICTY has contributed tremendously to the development
of this body of humanitarian law. The Goldstone Commission antedated
or preceded the Truth Commissions in South Africa. And he is perhaps
one of the few people who, having been involved in both processes, can
provide unique perspective in evaluating advantages and disadvantages
of criminal prosecution in the Truth Commission procedures.
I ask you now to give a warm welcome to our distinguished
colleague and friend Richard Goldstone.
(Applause.)
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: Good morning. Thank you for your
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introduction, Professor Del Duca. It's a great pleasure to be back at Penn
State and to have an association going back some years with the
Dickinson School of Law.
Pre-Nuremberg Impunity
Until the Nuremberg Trials, there was effective impunity for war
criminals. At home, they were generally regarded as war heroes and not
war criminals. With one or two minor exceptions, military and political
leaders who were guilty of the most heinous war crimes enjoyed
effective impunity. They were simply not brought to trial. There was no
justice for the victims.
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials
But the Nuremberg Trials of the major Nazi criminals and the
subsequent Tokyo Trials of the Japanese leaders ignited a flame of hope
for a new system of international criminal justice. Hence, we find a
reference in the 1948 Genocide Convention to an international criminal
court having jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. One finds a similar
reference in the 1973 International Convention that declared apartheid in
my own country, South Africa, to be a crime against humanity.
However, the Cold War intervened and the flame that was ignited at
Nuremberg spluttered and almost went out during the following half
century of inaction. There was no significant advance in the endeavors
to set up an international criminal court and international humanitarian
law was effectively left in limbo.
Security Council Decision to Establish the Ad Hoc Tribunals
Then in 1993, there was the surprising decision by the Security
Council to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. It did so, using its peremptory powers under Chapter Seven
of the United Nations Charter under which it is empowered to pass
peacekeeping resolutions that are binding and peremptory on every
single member state.
It is important to recognize the politics behind that unusual and
unexpected development. Clearly, if the Rwanda genocide had come
first and not succeeded the genocide in the former Yugoslavia, I don't
believe there can be any doubt that there would not have been an
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It would have been treated
in the same way as genocide in Cambodia or the genocide committed by
Saddam Hussein against his own Kurdish population, and the many
terrible war crimes committed in Africa and Asia since the Second
World War. In those cases there was no serious thought given to
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establish an international war crimes tribunal.
But the politics of 1993 were different in respect to the former
Yugoslavia. Firstly, it was in Europe where the major European nations
said after the Holocaust, that this kind of egregious conduct would never
happen again, and here it was happening in their backyard and they felt a
responsibility for it; and they felt something had to be done about it.
Secondly, the Cold War had come to an end and there was a window of
opportunity in 1993 during which both Russia and China were prepared
to vote affirmatively to set up this international war crimes tribunal.
There was also the growing influence of international and national
human rights organizations. They influenced politicians in Europe and
North America to support an international war crimes tribunal. And, of
course, when the Rwanda genocide happened in the middle of 1994, the
precedent had been created. The Yugoslavia Tribunal had been
established, and it wasn't difficult for the Security Council to agree to the
request from the government of Rwanda to set up a second international
criminal court. There were political complications that later induced
Rwanda to oppose the Tribunal. That is a complicated story and there is
no time to consider it now.
Lessons to be Learned
Contribution of the U.S. to the ICTY & ICTR
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the two ad hoc
tribunals. The first is the important contribution made by the United
States. Madeleine Albright, who was then the United States Ambassador
at the United Nations "the fairy godmother" of the ICTY and ICTR. She
drove the Clinton Administration to give tremendous support for both
those tribunals. From my personal experience as the First Chief
Prosecutor of both, I can assure you that neither of them would have
been set up and neither of them would have got off the ground without
the support from the United States administration. Personnel, financial
assistance, computer technicians, you name it-the United States
provided crucial assistance. And David Scheffer, who was then the
Chief Counsel of Madeleine Albright, and subsequently became the first
Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes, was my chaperone in
Washington. He took me to the CIA, Justice, and the FBI. It was
through their efforts that we received important intelligence information.
Top rate people from Justice and from the military came to work in The
Hague and in Rwanda. One cannot overemphasize the importance of the
role played by the United States in the early and the middle years of both
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals.
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Required Political Support for the Tribunals
A second lesson, one often ignored, is that it's all about politics.
Without politics you wouldn't have international criminal justice at all.
Without politicians and without politics, these things don't happen and
won't happen. One tends to forget that, and one assumes that these
institutions are there and it's a given and many people I think ignore the
important politics without which the birth of these tribunals would not
have taken place.
Development of International Humanitarian Laws
The third lesson is the huge development of international
humanitarian law in consequence of it being used. Again it's a truism, if
the law isn't used, it's not really worth the paper it's written on. I have
untold admiration for the International Committee of the Red Cross (the
ICRC). They continued, year after year, decade after decade, to update
and refine humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions.
It's to their great credit they did this at times when these laws were
hardly used. I believe that international humanitarian lawyers owe a
huge debt of gratitude to the ICRC. Without them we wouldn't have the
body of law that we have today. The ad hoc tribunals and the hybrid
tribunals that have followed have daily used those laws. In being used,
humanitarian law has developed in many areas.
Gender Related Crimes-Recognition in the ICC Rome Treaty
The obvious example is gender-related crime. Systematic mass rape
and other gender crimes were ignored by humanitarian law. When
evidence of these crimes emerged with regard to both the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the role of women judges on the ad hoc
tribunals became crucial. They pushed for adequate attention to be given
to them. What followed was a whole new exciting development in the
recognition and the prosecution of gender-related crimes. This is well
reflected in the wide definitions of these crimes in the Rome Treaty for
the International Criminal Court.
When we started the Yugoslavia Tribunal, rape was referred to only
in one area of our jurisdiction and that was crimes against humanity. The
horrors of gender-related crimes have been ignored principally, I believe,
because the "laws of war," as it was then called, was written by men for
men and rape was simply brushed off as one of the unfortunate but
inevitable consequences of war. That's changed and it's been a very
important change.
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International Criminal Courts Can Provide Fair Trials
The fourth lesson, and it may seem obvious now, but it didn't when
we started, and that is that international criminal courts can provide fair
trials. That wasn't a given. Many lawyers and academics seriously
doubted whether you could get judges and prosecutors and investigators
coming together from 40, 50, 60 countries, civil law systems, common
law systems, and all different systems in between, and conduct fair trials.
I haven't read or heard any serious criticism of the fairness of the trials
that have been held in any of these tribunals.
What helped was that most of the judges and prosecutors came from
a human rights background-not from a typical prosecuting office
background. And I think that's made a difference. But I think all of
them, whatever their background, have been very aware of the fact that if
the trials in these courts were perceived to be unfair, the whole system
would collapse. The whole endeavor would fail. The policy of. the
prosecutors has been to prefer to lose cases rather than win them by
unfair means. Greater attention has been given by the prosecutors and
judges to the fairness of the proceedings. They were aware that it was
the most crucial aspect of the whole undertaking.
Independence of the Courts and Prosecution
The fifth lesson is that international courts acquire a life of their
own and they develop an existence divorced from their parent. The
Yugoslavia Tribunal had to determine whether it was lawfully created. It
had to decide for itself in the appeals chamber whether the Security
Council had the legal power to create it. And little did the Security
Council think that this sub-organ that it created would turn around and
have to determine whether the Security Council acted lawfully in setting
it up. And generally speaking, the independence of the judges, the
independence of the prosecutor was crucially important in divorcing
these institutions from the parent that created them.
International Criminal Justice Can Act as a Deterrent
The sixth and last lesson to which I will refer is that international
criminal justice can act as a deterrent. It's difficult to establish
deterrence. How do you prove what would have happened in a situation
if there hadn't been this or there hadn't been that? But the best
illustration (and I wish I had one from oppressive regimes), relates to the
use of military force to stop the ethnic cleansing by Serbia of the Muslim
population of Kosovo in 1999. There were seventy-eight days of
bombing by NATO force-seventy-eight days of the heaviest bombing
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since World War II. There were less than 2,000 civilian casualties. This
was a remarkable feat. The reason, I have no doubt, was that the
military commanders in Washington, D.C., in Bonn, in London, in Paris,
all had military lawyers driving the generals crazy in insisting that they
carefully choose military targets and protect civilians.
I've put this to senior people at the Pentagon and I've discussed it
fairly recently with the Deputy Commander of the German Army. I
asked why were there remarkably so few civilian casualties. In Vietnam
90 percent of the victims were civilians. In Korea over 80 percent of the
victims were civilians. In World War II over 50 percent of the victims
were civilians. In civil wars in the second half of the 2 0 th Century more
than 90% of the victims were civilians. Why now all of a sudden was
there this difference? I was given two reasons-in both Washington,
D.C. and in Berlin. The first was the use of precision ammunition.
Modem technology makes it easier to be precise in taking out a military
target. The second was the presence of the ICTY looking over the
shoulders of army leaders to see whether war crimes might be committed
by the NATO forces. It was important that the ICTY had jurisdiction
over war crimes committed anywhere in the former Yugoslavia. So I
think that's certainly one illustration of deterrence.
It probably made a difference, too, in Operation Storm, when the
Croatian leaders warned their troops to protect civilians. They
committed war crimes, but my guess and my instinct was that the war
crimes would have been more egregious but for the jurisdiction of the
ICTY.
End of Impunity for Heads of State
There has also been the successful end to impunity for heads of state
and former heads of state, not only in the Balkans and in Rwanda. It
spread to other regions. I remember reading a few years ago about the
former President of Indonesia, Suharto, an oppressive war criminal,
having to cancel medical treatment in a German clinic because he feared
a warrant of arrest might have been waiting for him at Frankfurt Airport.
Then there was Haile Mariam Mengistu, the former dictator of Ethiopia,
who was wanted for egregious war crimes in his own country. He was
inappropriately given asylum by President Mugabe in Zimbabwe. He
checked into a Johannesburg clinic. Human Rights Watch in New York
heard about it and raised an alarm. Before South Africa could even
consider whether there was jurisdiction in our courts, Mengistu hurriedly
left the clinic and went back to Harare and had to accept medical
treatment there.
It's interesting how the worst war criminals, the worst perpetrators
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of the most savage treatment of their people always want the best
medical treatment for themselves. Many of them want vacations on the
French Riviera or elsewhere in the world. They now no longer travel to
the same extent. It's good news for human rights and probably bad news
for their travel agents, but they're staying at home and traveling less and
that I think must also act as a deterrent. The trial of Charles Taylor must
be sending chills up and down the spines of other oppressive leaders
within Africa or on other continents.
ICC and the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference
In any event, there were these tremendously exciting developments
that led to the setting up of the International Criminal Court at the
Diplomatic Conference in Rome in the middle of 1998.
Those successes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals led the
United States to put pressure on Kofi Annan, then newly appointed
United Nations Secretary-General, to call a diplomatic conference to set
up an international criminal court. That happened in June and July of
1998. And, as many of you all know, 120 nations voted in favor of the
statute setting up the international court. Only seven nations voted
against it, including, unfortunately the United States.
The United States had initially been a strong supporter of the
International Criminal Court. On my reading of the situation, it was
during the few months before the Rome conference that the Pentagon
decided that it wasn't a good idea. It was senior generals in the Pentagon
who decided that it wasn't in the interests of the United States to have an
international court looking over the shoulders of American generals and
having jurisdiction over American troops. They didn't like the idea and
they sent strong messages to the White House that they strongly opposed
the International Criminal Court.
The System of Complementarity and the Pre-Trial Chamber
I think it's a matter for regret that President Clinton buckled under
that pressure and the United States policy changed. It must be
recognized, however, that I think it was the United States' antipathy to an
independent international criminal court that led to some of the
protections built into the Rome Statute-the system of complementarity,
the fact that the ICC is a court of last resort and not first resort, that
national courts have the first bite at prosecutions. I think that's a good
thing. So too, is the idea of a pre-trial chamber-that the chief
prosecutor is not completely independent and that he is overseen by a
pre-trial chamber.
Unfortunately, the Pentagon's opposition continued and the United
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States ended up voting against the treaty. Yet, in one of his last acts in
office, President Clinton signed the Rome Treaty but did not refer it to
the Senate for its approval. The threat from Senator Jesse Helms was
probably correct. He said it would be dead on arrival and it would have
been. And the opposition would not have only come from the
Republican Party. It would have come from the Democratic Party as
well.
A la Carte Use of International Laws
The United States has always had a suspicion of international law,
of international organizations, and of international courts. And that
comes from power. The United States shares it with other powerful
nations. China and Russia have the same position. The powerful don't
want to be policed. They want others to be policed. The United States
likes to use international law as an a la carte menu, using those parts it
fancies at a particular time and rejecting those that don't suit its interests
or what they perceive to be their interests at another time.
Speedy Ratification of the Rome Treaty
Nobody expected that there would.be the necessary 60 ratifications
of the Rome Treaty within much less than a decade. It took four years.
And today over half the members of the United Nations have ratified the
Rome Treaty, including all members of the European Union. Africa
leads with 27 countries having ratified, followed by Western Europe with
25 nations.
Implementation Problems
Problems have emerged. First, there is the peace versus justice
debate. Ambassador Okun is going to talk about that. One of the
problems he will no doubt address is the refusal of the Sudan to
cooperate with the ICC. Their investigators are not allowed into the
country. We were more fortunate at the ICTY. Although our
investigators weren't allowed into Serbia and it was difficult to get into
Croatia, we had hundreds of thousands of witnesses elsewhere. In
Germany alone there were over 300,000 victims of ethnic cleansing who
were available to us as crucial eyewitnesses. And, there were many
others elsewhere in Europe.
Problems of perception have also arisen in the light of the Milogevi6
and Saddam Hussein trials. Many critics use those two trials as a basis
for criticizing international justice, but of course it's a false argument. It
would be the equivalent of judging the American criminal justice system
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by the O.J. Simpson trial. These are aberrational trials and in no way
reflect the hard work and the successful trials that have been going on
day after day now for over a decade.
The most important negative aspect for international criminal justice
at the moment is the hostility of the United States to the International
Criminal Court. From what I've said, I think you can understand the
importance of the support of the United States to the other International
Criminal Courts. With regard to the United States, in the beginning I
assumed, as I'm sure most people did, that it was a sort of instinctive
dislike that the United States has always had for international institutions
and international law. Unfortunately, it's now more serious because the
United States has demonstrated that it too is capable and, in fact, does
commit war crimes. I hasten to add that they are not on a scale
comparable to the war crimes about which I've been talking. However,
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have reinforced the opposition of
conservatives in this country. They are saying that if we were members
of the International Criminal Court, within months we will be dragged
before their court.
It's obviously a false argument. The sorts of crimes committed by
United States troops that have come to light thus far would not even fall
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. They're
looking at the most egregious crimes committed on a large scale.
More recently, there have been attempts by the Bush Administration
to circumvent the provisions of the Torture Convention and of the
Geneva Conventions. This weakens respect for the law, and not only in
the United States. Unfortunately it has a knock-on effect. If the most
powerful nation in the world regards the Geneva Conventions, as it was
stated by the former attorney general, as being "quaint," this brings
disrespect and disrepute on those important laws.
Judicial Action
The pendulum is swinging and I am cautiously optimistic. The
judiciary is stepping in, and this is unusual. The United States Supreme
Court was pretty supine in previous comparable situations--one thinks
of the internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II and even
going back to President Lincoln's withdrawing civil rights at the time of
the Civil War. The United States Supreme Court, like the House of
Lords in England, has stepped in to set aside some of the more wayward
actions by governments both in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
So we're at a crucial juncture for the future. The question is
whether we'll return to the pre-Nuremberg days of impunity for war
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criminals-I believe not. I believe that the citizens in democracies don't
want that. And I believe too that political leaders don't want it. I believe
that the leaders of the major democracies are beginning to realize the
importance of reciprocity in international humanitarian law. One is
hearing more frequently in the Senate statements to the effect that if we
ill treat foreign prisoners under our care, it's a matter of time before other
countries treat our people in the same way and we won't be in a position
to say or do much about it.
Perhaps the most important consideration is that the United States
and other democracies would hardly enjoy a world without the rule of
law. Commercial reasons, apart from political, dictate where the
interests of democracies lie. It is important for universities and the
academy to consider these questions and I congratulate Professor Del
Duca for organizing this interesting conference. Thank you very much.
(Applause.)
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Ladies and gentlemen we are at the
point where we have time available for comments from the panel and
questions from the audience. Would any of the panelists like to
comment? Yes. We will proceed from here with questions from our
audience.
PROFESSOR CRANE: Richard, I deeply appreciate your
comments because they're coming from someone who has been there. I
have just two points. Politics I think drives the international criminal
justice train. The bottom line is that my experience in West Africa is that
if the international community doesn't want to do it, it doesn't happen. I
think it's just something that students who are getting into this business
need to understand that political support is necessary but politics is also
something that historically, as well today, is a threat.
I couldn't agree with you more having been at the international
level and experiencing the disappointment as an American citizen to see
the loss of the moral high ground of the United States. Henry King and I
just wrote an op-ed in Jurist this last week talking about this. We were
recently celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the judgments at
Nuremberg and chatting about how the United States led the way
morally in prosecuting those individuals who did such horrible things in
World War II. Yet as you compare and contrast 60 years later, the
United States now-I heard one international politician call the United
States the world's thug. Now, I don't think that's true, but the fact that it
resonated is something that we need to be concerned about. I think two
comments are particularly important for us to keep in mind not only
today but also in the future.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Dermot, Groome.
PROFESSOR GROOME: On the issue of politics, I guess my
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question or what I'm wondering is do you see for the future of
international criminal law, do you see politics having such a significant
role? I think both you and David established the beachheads that had to
be defended very early on. Do you think there will ever come a time
when they'll be secure enough that so much of a prosecutor's efforts
won't have to be devoted to politics?
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: No, because the politics is the engine. If
you take the engine out, then the whole thing doesn't work. And politics
is the engine of international criminal courts. Money comes from
countries and it is politicians that have to vote it.
Crucially, enforcement is political. There's no enforcement of any
court order of an international court without political will on the
governments from the countries who have to enforce the orders. I know
that David Crane and I have probably spent well over 50 percent of our
time in diplomacy, not sitting and drafting indictments. In the beginning
in the ICTY, I spent probably 80 percent of my time on diplomacy. I
would go to capitals and arrange for my investigators to travel in their
countries. We had to get laws passed. We had to continue getting
money from a cash-strapped United Nations. And I'm sure both David
and I could go on regaling you with stories about the politics that we
were personally involved with. Had we not done it, neither of those
institutions would have been viable.
PROFESSOR CRANE: The tribunals, looking at it historically and
into the future, are creatures of political events. Usually there are
conflicts someplace, somewhere. They are also creatures of political
compromise in the international community, whatever that means, but
the global community reacts and they decide to do something.
A threat that we have to be very careful of is that I've heard
diplomats and politicians say well, now that we have the ICC, we will
just give it to them. That's also a political kind of perspective that we
have to be very, very careful of.
But again it will always be politics. It's a bright red theme that
throughout the history of tribunals or lack thereof because it was also a
political decision to do nothing. We can give many examples of that in
history, particularly in the twentieth century, the world's bloodiest
century, where the world just looked the other way and let it happen and
did nothing. In my mind, the worst atrocity that I can think of is the
death of millions of people and nothing is done and they disappear in the
sands of history, such as Armenia where we had between 10 and 15
million die at the beginning of the twentieth century.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Professor Ross, you had a question?
PROFESSOR ROSS: You mentioned in the introduction, Justice
Goldstone, you also witnessed another way of dealing with crimes
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against humanity, which is the South African Truth and Reconciliation
process. I wonder if you could offer some views from an international
context why that process is no longer really being seriously considered.
My understanding of the international documents creating the
International Criminal Court is that it maintains the way we deal with
war crimes is to prosecute and punish war criminals, which was
obviously not the approach that the Republic of South Africa took. I
wonder if you could comment on going down that way and the propriety
of either mandating or at least building in the flexibility to move to a
truth and reconciliation process as opposed to the crime and punishment
line.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: I don't see any contradiction between
prosecutions and truth commissions. I think they're two tools that can be
used either separately or together. The ICC, hybrid tribunals, ad hoc
tribunals, truth commissions. Whether with or without amnesties, are
different tools for dealing with past serious human rights violations. I
rather see them like a surgeon's instruments. He decides for which
operation and for which procedure he needs this scalpel or that. I don't
think one can generalize. I think one's got to look at it country by
country, region by region, to decide whether prosecutions will bring
about lasting and enduring peace and reconciliation or whether you want
truth commissions or whether you want both.
In South Africa we had both. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission so far is unique in also having discrete
amnesties as an inducement to get the truth. We had not only the
evidence of over 21,000 victims, but also over 7,000, applicants for
amnesty. This huge outpouring of information in the two and a half
years of the life of the South African TRC has given South Africa a
wonderful gift. We have now one history of what happened in the
apartheid era.
Without the Truth Commission there would have been two major
histories, a white history of denial and fabrication and a black history
from the victims who know what happened to them. Their history would
have approximated the truth. But now we have one history and my
grandchildren and their children will be taught the same history. So
that's very important. But the prosecutions were crucial. People
wouldn't have come forward if they didn't fear prosecution. There
weren't sufficient prosecutions in my view, but I understand the
problems.
I certainly don't see any contradiction any more than I see a
contradiction between the hybrid tribunals and the ICC. I think they
compliment each other very well as part of the complimentary process.
If a country like Sierra Leone has a hybrid tribunal, it's doing the work
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that should be done there, not in the ICC. So I just don't see any of these
situations as being mutually exclusive.
PROFESSOR CRANE: Just to jump in very quickly. We had a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as an international tribunal
in Sierra Leone. They both reasonably worked together for about 90
percent of the time. We had an issue related to one of the defendants
who wanted to make a public spectacle before the TRC and the judge
rightfully said no, you're going to incriminate yourself and you're not
going to do that.
But putting that aside, we found that much of it is luck. It was not
planned by the international community. We actually had a domestic
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an international hybrid
tribunal. I'll talk a little more about it this afternoon. But I'm convinced
that to have a sustainable peace you have to both have truth and justice.
I'll explore that a little bit more this afternoon. Victims want to have
their stories told. They realize that it's not going to be before the tribunal
possibly, but they want to go to some organization to tell their story.
There were many times in Sierra Leone where they would come up to me
and literally tug on my sleeve telling me I want to tell you what
happened to me and my family. The TRC allows some of that to go
officially in the record. It's a reconciliation of itself and thousands of
Sierra Leoneans and West Africans went to the TRC to tell their stories.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Any questions? Yes.
STUDENT: You had mentioned that one of the victories of the
international tribunal is establishing that we are actually having fair trials
for the defendants. You had mentioned the trial in particular as an
example of things that go wrong. I assume that one of the things you
meant is allowing him to defend himself, but perhaps that can be seen as
one of the things that went very, very right in establishing the
international community's attention to giving these defendants their full
rights.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: I don't have any criticism of Milogevi6
being allowed to defend himself. I think under international law that's
his right. He had a right to defend himself, but it's not an absolute right
and I think that the judges allowed him to abuse that right. I think the
judges should have done what judges in the United States have done in
the case of defendants who misbehave themselves. There was the
Minutemen trial many years ago in New York where the defendants were
young, undisciplined outlaws who started shouting and screaming in
court and disrupted the proceeding. The judge sent them out of the court
and they weren't allowed to disrupt the trial.
I think Milogevi6 should have been told earlier that he had the right
to defend himself, but that if he abused that right it would be withdrawn.
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He should have been warned that if he did not behave himself, he could
go and watch his trial from his cell. "We'll give you a closed-circuit
television and we'll give you the remote, and if you want to switch it off,
it's your decision. But you can't use the platform as a political platform.
You can't continue for days to cross examine on irrelevant political
issues. We're not going to allow you to do it." They should have done
it, I believe from the beginning, and it wouldn't have taken two years for
the prosecution to present its case.
PROFESSOR DEL DUCA: Other questions? We still have a few
minutes. Yes, another question.
STUDENT: Along the lines of International Criminal Court, it's set
up as a court of last resort and the national courts have jurisdiction first.
Perhaps one of the U.S.'s worries as to becoming part of that treaty is
that U.S. soldiers will be tried in other nation's courts and that those
trials will not be fair trials in regards to our troops.
JUDGE GOLDSTONE: Well, there's nothing to stop any nation
from putting United States troops on trial under the present law, and this
has nothing to do with the International Criminal Court. If I go into the
streets here this afternoon and murder somebody, I'll go on trial in your
court. I can't say I want to be tried in my court in South Africa. If you
come to my country and commit a criminal offense, you're amenable to
the courts of my country. If the United States troops commit war crimes
in any country in the world, they're amenable to the courts of that
country. That's the present law. The International Criminal Court isn't
something different.
In the case of the International Criminal Court, 102 nations have
said we can do that together. If citizens of the United States or any other
country commit a war crime in our country, our courts have jurisdiction.
What we're doing is we're going to pool that. What we can do singly,
we're going to do together. If somebody commits a war crime on my
territory by joining the International Criminal Court, I'm prepared to
give the International Criminal Court jurisdiction if the court of the
national doesn't want to do it itself. This is not new. I don't understand
that objection from the United States.
AMBASSADOR OKUN: Yes, that's absolutely right. The
existence of the ICC actually limits that kind of behavior you talked
about; that is to say, the question of universal jurisdiction being lodged in
a national court. Now, there is an argument ongoing in the legal
community actually, a theoretical argument, whether that should not be
the case; that is to say, if it is universally recognized that there are
universal crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, they
ought to be triable not only at the ICC or in the ad hoc tribunals, but in
national courts, but it's losing its favor.
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I can give two relevant examples. In Belgium, which had this in
their domestic legislation, they actually had given themselves the right to
enforce the law. One of the indictees was the former prime minister of
Israel, Sharon, because of his alleged war crimes in the Lebanon War of
1982, which were very serious. He was condemned by the Israeli
Judicial Commission. Anyway, it didn't happen. Not only did that not
happen, the Belgian legislature, their congress, actually withdrew the law
after a couple of years because they saw it was overreaching. They
realized that not only because of the ICC, but just because of the politics
of the matter, it simply wasn't realistic.
The other case where it was applied and was of course and still in a
way is alive is the case of Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator. You
may remember he was arrested and put in the United Kingdom under a
Spanish warrant from Judge Garzon actually because he had killed-his
government had murdered Spanish citizens during the Chilean
dictatorship and the British executed the warrant of arrest, but it was
fairly quickly quashed and he was flown back to Chile where he is still at
age 91 undergoing certain trials.
But that entire issue that Senator Helms made so much fuss about
really is a red herring, but he made a big fuss. He even got the U.S.
congress to pass a law that if any U.S. soldier were arrested and brought
to The Hague for trial before any court that the U.S. gave itself the right
to intervene militarily to free him, which people in Washington call the
Invade Holland Act you see. But I think that's a passing issue at this
point.
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